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There is no single answer to the question: What is intellectual history?1 Comment-
ing in the mid-1980s on two recent volumes dedicated to the sub-discipline's methods
and perspectives,2 John Pocock wryly remarked: "I recommend reading them, but after
doing so myself, I am persuaded that whatever 'intellectual history' is, and whatever
'the history of ideas' may be, I am not engaged in doing either of them."3 In the United
States, in many respects the heartland of intellectual history, the scholarly community
has grappled with the ambiguous relationship of "intellectual history" to "the history
of ideas" for almost a century. The term "intellectual history", coined by James Har-
vey Robinson at the beginning of the twentieth century, was adopted by a variety of
scholars who, mostly focussed on a well-defined period of time, either favoured a func-
tionalist conception of ideas as epiphenomenal or preferred a more autonomous yet
still contextualist understanding of historical thought.4 Arthur O. Lovejoy, who co-
founded the History of Ideas Club in 1923, advanced the alternative approach, setting
out to trace the meanings of essentially unchanging, molecule-like "unit-ideas" from
ancient to modern times without any sustained contextualization.5 Since then, both
terms have either been used interchangeably or they have been kept separate to refer
1 This article is based on research conducted as a Feodor Lynen Research Fellow at Saint Louis Univer-
sity, Missouri, U.S.A. I am indebted to Frank Lorenz Müller (St Andrews) for his comments and to the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for the award of the fellowship.
2 Preston King (ed.), The History of Ideas. An Introduction to Method, London/Canberra 1983; Do-
minick LaCapra/Steven L. Kaplan (eds.), Modern European Intellectual History. Reappraisals and
New Perspectives, Ithaca/London 1982.
3 J.G.A. Pocock, What is Intellectual History?, in: History Today 35 (Oct. 1985), pp. 52-53, here p. 52.
4 James Harvey Robinson, An Introduction to the History of Western Europe, Boston/London 1902;
id., An Outline of the History of the Intellectual Class in Western Europe, New York 1911; id., Some
Reflections on Intellectual History, in: id., The New History. Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical
Outlook, New York 1912, pp. 101-131. Early examples of either strand of “intellectual history” may
be found in the work of Charles A. Beard, Carl Becker, Vernon L. Parrington, Merle Curti, and Perry
Miller.
5 See Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea. The William
James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University, 1933, Cambridge, Mass./London 1936; id., Essays in
the History of Ideas [published for the History of Ideas Club of the Johns Hopkins University], new
ed. New York 1960 (first published 1948).
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to distinct scholarly traditions, usually differentiating between the "external" contex-
tualist approach of "intellectual history" and the "internal" approach of "the history of
ideas".6 The confusion has been compounded by the diversity of attempts to define key
analytical terms such as "idea" and "concept".7
In the broadest sense, intellectual history has been linked to a variety of scholarly
fields. The most important ones are the history of philosophy, the philosophy of his-
tory, the history of science, the history of literature, the history of art, discourse his-
tory, conceptual history, the history of political thought, the history of ideologies, the
history of political cultures (Politische Kulturforschung), the cultural history of politics
(Kulturgeschichte des Politischen), the history of intellectuals, the history of mentalities
(histoire des mentalités), the history of the book, media history, and visual history. The
issue as to where to draw the line between intellectual history and cultural history has
been particularly fiercely contested.8
Methodological debates on intellectual history have usually been centred on six crit-
ical issues. First, the purpose of intellectual history: Should scholars in the field pri-
marily aim to historicize past thought, largely confining themselves to revisiting and
reconstituting "archives" of ideas, or should they also discuss topical concerns in a
future-oriented "laboratory" of Ideenpolitik, engaging in intellectual history as a way
of making politics?9 Second, and related to the first issue, the existence of perennial
questions: Can intellectual historians legitimately explore, without falling into the trap
of anachronism, the ways in which thinkers, from Plato to Pareto, dealt with issues that
are taken to have a timeless quality and are believed to transcend historical periods?
Third, the explanation of intellectual transmutations: How are intellectual historians to
account for changing ideas over time? What strategies can they adopt to unravel the
complex relationship between intellectual and social change? And how are they to ap-
proach the interplay between structure and agency vis-à-vis ideational modifications?
Fourth, the interrelation of text and context, often referred to, if somewhat misleadingly,
as the inside-outside, or internal-external, relation: How should intellectual historians
6 A similar ambiguity has marked the usage of the terms Geistesgeschichte and Ideengeschichte.
7 While compelling analytical definitions of the term “idea” are largely wanting, there are many accounts
on its conceptual history. See, for instance, George Boas, Idea, in: The Dictionary of the History of
Ideas. Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, ed. by Philip P. Wiener, Vol. 2, New York 1973, pp. 542-549;
H. Meinhardt et al., Idee, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. by Joachim Ritter, Vol.
3, Basel/Stuttgart 1974, pp. 56-133; and most recently Andreas Dorschel, Ideengeschichte, Göttingen
2010, pp. 46-87.
8 See, for instance, the symposium on Intellectual History in the Age of Cultural Studies, in: Intellectual
History Newsletter 18 (1996), pp. 3-69; and the “interchange” on The Practice of History, in: Journal of
American History 90 (2003), pp. 576-611, here esp. pp. 588-591; see also Donald R. Kelley, Intellectual
History and Cultural History. The Inside and the Outside, in: History of the Human Sciences 15 (2002),
No. 2, pp. 1-19.
9 I borrow the distinction between “the archive” and “the laboratory” from Herfried Münkler, Politis-
che Ideengeschichte, in: id. (ed.), Politikwissenschaft. Ein Grundkurs, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2003,
pp. 103-131, here pp. 103-104; for a similar approach that distinguishes between “the archive” and
“the arsenal”, see Marcus Llanque, Politische Ideengeschichte. Ein Gewebe politischer Diskurse,
München/Wien 2008, pp. 1-3; see also Marcus Llanque, Geschichte politischen Denkens oder Ideen-
politik. Ideengeschichte als normative Traditionsstiftung, in: Harald Bluhm/Jürgen Gebhardt (eds.),
Politische Ideengeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Konzepte und Kritik, Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 51-69.
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situate ideas that are traceable in textual utterances, in the discursive web of other texts
as well as in the context of social structures, cultural milieus, political systems and insti-
tutions? Fifth, the objects of historical inquiry: Should intellectual historians primarily
investigate ideas, concepts, ideologies or "languages"? Should they primarily deal with
one or two individuals, or should they attend to larger groups of people, perhaps even
"collectives of thought"? Should they focus on "great thinkers" and/or "intellectuals"
(a notoriously contested term)10 or should they concentrate on other, potentially less
esoteric agents of thought, including the supposedly "inarticulate masses"? Sixth, and
related to the former issue, the source-base: Should intellectual historians confine them-
selves to textual utterances (in the stricter sense of the word) or should they stretch the
limits of their field and consult visual and audible material as well – and if so, how?
Intellectual History: A Field of Elusive Boundaries
What complicates the mapping of the sub-discipline's precincts is a bundle of overlap-
ping issues. To begin with, contributions to the field of intellectual history have been
made by a wide array of scholars – these hailing from different national traditions,
grounded in varying academic subjects, and employing diverse methodological ap-
proaches. Moreover, communication between these various scholars has often proven
rather limited. For instance, the numerous debates on intellectual history in American
academia went largely unnoticed in Germany until very recently.11 Even the occasional
reference to Arthur O. Lovejoy in German works may sometimes do more to obscure
American traditions of intellectual history than illuminate them.12 By contrast, tradi-
tions of Geistesgeschichte and Ideengeschichte did find their way into American academia,
primarily through the conduit of German émigrés such as Ernst Cassirer, Peter Gay, Fe-
lix Gilbert, George Mosse, Fritz Stern and Leo Strauss.
To be sure, there have also been sustained attempts to mediate between the
Cambridge School of intellectual history and the German history of concepts
(Begriffsgeschichte).13 Yet, some concessions notwithstanding, the schools' main protag-
onists proved fairly reluctant to buy into one another's analytical language and tended
10 For the most plausible suggestion as to how to define an “intellectual” see Stefan Collini, Absent Minds.
Intellectuals in Britain, Oxford 2006.
11 For a notable exception see Tim B. Müller, Der linguistic turn ins Jenseits der Sprache. Geschichtswis-
senschaft zwischen Theorie und Trauma. Eine Annäherung an Dominick LaCapra, in: Jürgen Trabant
(ed.), Sprache der Geschichte, München 2005, pp. 107-132.
12 One may, for instance, be stretching the special relationship between Britain and the United States
if one ascribes Lovejoy, alongside G.H. Sabine, to the realm of English academia. See Luise Schorn-
Schütte, Historische Politikforschung. Eine Einführung, München 2006, pp. 53-56; ead., Neue Geis-
tesgeschichte, in: Joachim Eibach/Günther Lottes (eds.), Kompass der Geschichtswissenschaft. Ein
Handbuch, Göttingen 2002, pp. 270-280, here p. 270.
13 See above all the perceptive comparisons drawn by Melvin Richter, The History of Political and So-
cial Concepts. A Critical Introduction, New York/Oxford 1995; see also Iain Hampsher-Monk/Karin
Tilmans/Frank van Vree (eds.), History of Concepts. Comparative Perspectives, Amsterdam 1998;
Kari Palonen, Die Entzauberung der Begriffe. Das Umschreiben der politischen Begriffe bei Quentin
Skinner und Reinhart Koselleck, Münster 2003.
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to stress methodological differences instead.14 Moreover, despite the great attention
that the Cambridge School has received from German historians and political scien-
tists,15 its approaches have been rarely deployed in German-speaking historical writ-
ing and are largely conspicuous by their absence from contemporary history in par-
ticular.16 Ultimately, while attracting the attention of five discussion forums in major
Anglo-American journals, Mark Bevir's Logic of the History of Ideas – one of the salient
books in the last few decades on the method of intellectual history – has barely made
an impact in Germany.17
Furthermore, it is not only national parochialism18 but subject-specific deformations
(in the sense of déformations professionnelles) which have created multiple parallel uni-
verses that go by the name of intellectual history or one of its conceptual cognates. The
frequently invoked objective of interdisciplinarity – certainly one of the most popular
commonplaces of the field – has often bumped up against disciplinary boundaries and
institutional barriers. Whether one delves into the writings of philosophers, histori-
ans, political scientists, sociologists or literary critics, one will encounter very different
notions of intellectual history.19
Subject-specific peculiarities feed diverse methodological allegiances, even if there
is considerable transdisciplinary crossover. While for obvious reasons hermeneutics
still looms large in the differing worlds of intellectual history, still hotly debated are
the intricacies of hermeneutical traditions, whether in the vein of Wilhelm Dilthey, R.G.
Collingwood, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer or Paul Ricœur. Some scholars
have, for example, revisited Collingwood's much criticized notion of "re-enactment",20
14 See, for instance, J.G.A. Pocock, Concepts and Discourses. A Difference in Culture? Comment on
a Paper by Melvin Richter, in: Hartmut Lehmann/Melvin Richter (eds.), The Meaning of Historical
Terms and Concepts. New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte, Washington D.C. 1996, pp. 47-58; see also
Quentin Skinner, Rhetoric and Conceptual Change, in: Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 3 (1999),
pp. 60-73.
15 See most recently the well-informed introduction by Marion Heinz/Martin Ruehl, Nachwort, in:
Quentin Skinner, Visionen des Politischen, ed. by Marion Heinz and Martin Ruehl, Frankfurt a. M.
2009, pp. 253-286; see also the collection of articles by Martin Mulsow/Andreas Mahler (eds.), Die
Cambridge School der politischen Ideengeschichte, Frankfurt a. M. 2010.
16 The Cambridge School has, of course, most extensively published on early modern history, but its
approaches are principally not limited to this period.
17 Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, Cambridge 1999; see the discussion forums in: Re-
thinking History 4 (2000), No. 3, pp. 295-372; Philosophical Books 42 (2001), pp. 161-195; History of
European Ideas 28 (2002), pp. 1-117; History of the Human Sciences 15 (2002), No. 2, pp. 99-133; His-
tory & Theory 41 (2002), pp. 198-217; for a brief overview of Bevir’s approach in German, however, see
Philip Ajouri, Lovejoy und die Folgen, in: Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte 1 (2007), No. 2, pp. 116-121,
here pp. 118-121.
18 For a useful compilation of perspectives on national traditions of the history of political thought see
Dario Castiglione/Iain Hampsher-Monk (eds.), The History of Political Thought in National Context,
Cambridge 2001; see also the instructive article by Ernst Schulin, German “Geistesgeschichte”, Ameri-
can “Intellectual History” and French “Histoire des Mentalités” since 1900. A Comparison, in: History
of European Ideas 1 (1981), No. 3, pp. 195-214.
19 For an account of the multifaceted nature of the field, which is littered with names of key figures, see
the book by the former editor of the Journal of the History of Ideas Donald R. Kelley, The Descent of Ideas.
The History of Intellectual History, Aldershot 2002; see also Dorschel, Ideengeschichte.
20 See Giuseppina D’Oro, Re-Enactment and Radical Interpretation, in: History & Theory 43 (2004),
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while others, informed by "folk-psychological" frameworks of beliefs, desires and in-
tentions, rediscovered empathy as a way of understanding and explaining histori-
cal agency.21 Intellectual historians have also sought methodological inspiration from
philosophers of language: Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Austin, W.V. Quine and Donald
Davidson provided vital insights into the production of meaning and suggested imagi-
native ways of (radical) interpretation that proved beneficial to several exponents of the
field. Others, however, have primarily drawn on Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowl-
edge and his studies on ideologies and styles of thought; or they have been guided by
Thomas S. Kuhn's approach to the history of science, which has set the tone for many
works of intellectual history since publication of his Structure of Scientific Revolutions
in 1962. Clifford Geertz's Interpretive Theory of Culture proved influential from the fol-
lowing decade on, as did Hayden White's Tropics of Discourse, which shed light on the
rhetorical and "poetic" nature of (historical) scholarship. Additionally, despite Michel
Foucault's fierce criticism of what he took to be the history of ideas, his discourse analy-
sis and archaeology of knowledge have also entered the intellectual history discussion
in certain quarters. By contrast, Niklas Luhmann's complex reflections on the evolution
of ideas and the correlation between semantic traditions and social structures still await
historians brave enough to translate his abstract theory into actual practice.22
Finally, for better or for worse, programmatic statements and methodological elabo-
rations tend to vary from actual practice. While Arthur O. Lovejoy has become a con-
venient whipping boy within and beyond the field – because he was careless or daring
enough to posit the timeless existence of "unit-ideas" – the actual products of his schol-
arship usually received better reviews.23 Needless to say, as a reaction to the popular
Lovejoy bashing, various scholars tried to salvage the philosopher's legacy of searching
for historical intelligibility and offered interpretations to which a less idealist audience
might be more receptive.24 By contrast, while Reinhart Koselleck's reflections on the
method of Begriffsgeschichte have attracted staunch, if not uncritical, followers within
pp. 198-208; William H. Dray, History as Re-Enactment. R.G. Collingwood’s Idea of History, Ox-
ford 1995; Markku Hyrkkänen, All History is, More or Less, Intellectual History. R.G. Collingwood’s
Contribution to the Theory and Methodology of Intellectual History, in: Intellectual History Review
19 (2009), pp. 251-263; Colin Tyler, Performativity and the Intellectual Historian’s Re-Enactment of
Written Works, in: Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (2009), pp. 167-186.
21 See especially Karsten R. Stueber, Rediscovering Empathy. Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human
Sciences, Cambridge, Mass./London 2006; id., Intentionalism, Intentional Realism, and Empathy, in:
Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (2009), pp. 290-307.
22 See, however, Reinhard Laube, Reisen mit Proviant. Luhmanns Ideengeschichte, in: Zeitschrift für
Ideengeschichte 2 (2008), No. 4, pp. 116-119, who refers to the study by Marie Theres Fögen, Römische
Rechtsgeschichten. Über Ursprung und Evolution eines sozialen Systems, Göttingen 2003.
23 See the perceptive comments by Maurice Mandelbaum, Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Theory of Histori-
ography, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 9 (1948), pp. 412-423; id., The History of Ideas, Intellectual
History, and the History of Philosophy, in: History & Theory 5 (1965), Beiheft 5, pp. 33-66; Louis O.
Mink, Change and Causality in the History of Ideas, in: Eighteenth-Century Studies 2 (1968), No. 1,
pp. 7-25.
24 See, for instance, John Patrick Diggins, Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Challenge of Intellectual History,
in: Journal of the History of Ideas 67 (2006), pp. 181-208; Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Making Sense of
Conceptual Change, in: History & Theory 47 (2008), pp. 351-372; see also Daniel J. Wilson, Lovejoy’s
The Great Chain of Being after Fifty Years, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987), pp. 187-206.
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and beyond German academia, their translation into practice prompted some trenchant
criticism. The multi-volume encyclopedia of "historical basic concepts" (Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe) seemed, in part, suspiciously close to an "elitist" history of ideas long
thought to be dead.
Texts, Contexts, Meanings and Beliefs: Approaches to Intellectual History
Much has been written on the Cambridge School of Intellectual History, not least by its
leading exponents, who seem to have entered a phase of self-memorialization. With the
awe-inspiring eloquence that brought him many admirers, Quentin Skinner has given
countless interviews in the last fifteen years, recalling his own intellectual socialization
and constructing a compelling narrative of the School's evolution. Apparently it all
started in the 1960s. Peter Laslett, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, published
his pathbreaking edition of John Locke's Two Treatises of Government in 1960, an edition
which placed the classic firmly in the historical context preceding the Glorious Revolu-
tion of 1688, thereby altering the treatises' interpretation for generations to come (they
had traditionally been viewed as a celebration of the Revolution).25 John Pocock pub-
lished his first methodological inquiries into the history of political thought in 1962 as
part of an important series founded and co-edited by Laslett.26 John Dunn, a fellow of
King's College, Cambridge, followed suit with reflections on the "identity" of the his-
tory of ideas, which appeared in 1968 and made the case for a fundamental revision
of the history of philosophy in general and the history of political thought in particu-
lar. Mocking the "bloodlessness" and unhistorical nature of a field preoccupied with
Platonic ideas and reified reconstructions of "great books", Dunn argued in favour of a
history of thought that rendered thinking a "social activity" and that investigated the
question as to what thinkers were "doing" in saying things, that is, when they engaged
in "speech acts" (John Austin) in a particular context at a particular time.27
Echoing Dunn's plea for a proper historical contextualization of ideas, Skinner pub-
lished an article in History & Theory in 1969 that was to provide intellectual histori-
ans with a key reference point in the field's methodological debates.28 Usually char-
acterized as "iconoclastic"29, Skinner's article sought to defend the autonomy of ideas
25 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Apparatus
Criticus by Peter Laslett, 2nd ed. Cambridge 1967 (first published 1960).
26 Pocock elaborated on the different “levels of abstraction” at which different political thinkers worked.
J.G.A. Pocock, The History of Political Thought. A Methodological Inquiry, in: Peter Laslett/W.G.
Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd series, Oxford 1962, also in: J.G.A. Pocock, Po-
litical Thought and History. Essays on Theory and Method, Cambridge 2009, pp. 3-19.
27 John Dunn, The Identity of the History of Ideas, in: Philosophy 43 (1968), No. 164, pp. 85-104, here pp.
87-88, 93-94.
28 Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in: History & Theory 8 (1969),
also in: James Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics, Princeton 1988, pp.
29-67. A much abbreviated and extensively revised version of the article appeared in: Quentin Skinner,
Visions of Politics, Vol. 1, Cambridge 2002, pp. 57-89.
29 See, for instance, James Tully, The Pen Is a Mighty Sword. Quentin Skinner’s Analysis of Politics, in:
Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context, pp. 7-25, here p. 7; and Glen Newey, How Do We Find Out What He
Meant?, in: Times Higher Education, 26 June 1998.
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against, on the one hand, the Namierite fashion of dismissing world-views as noth-
ing but claptrap with disguised vested interests, and, on the other, Marxist critiques of
ideology, which conceived ideas as straightforwardly based on socio-economic struc-
tures. More importantly, however, Skinner made a case for historicizing philosophical
texts and heaped scorn on various "anachronistic mythologies" that he exposed in the
"canonical" practice of intellectual historians. For instance, he criticized the mythol-
ogy of coherence that he thought to be generated by synoptic profiles of thinkers, this
rendering their thoughts much more consistent than they actually were.30 Indeed, it is
not least the intricate meanderings of Skinner's own work that underline the apposite-
ness of his critique.31 After all, his recent reflections on "classical republicanism" and
a "third concept of liberty" make for an astonishingly straightforward attempt to influ-
ence present ways of thinking – quite different from some of his earlier writings, which
gained him a reputation for antiquarian scholarship.32
What others dismissed as antiquarianism was above all a scathing critique of the con-
vention of approaching "great thinkers" with a particular range of supposedly "abiding
questions" (e.g. "Why should I obey the state?") and tapping into "classic texts" as a
never-ending source of "dateless wisdom" encased in purportedly "perennial" ideas.33
By contrast, Skinner heeded Collingwood's advice that questions as well as answers
were continually changing and that to understand a text historians had to see it as an
attempt to resolve a specific problem. Furthermore, Skinner took from Wittgenstein the
view that historians should not seek to unravel the general semantic meanings of words
but should rather investigate their concrete linguistic and hermeneutic meanings; that
is, historians should explore the specific usages of words in specific contexts and above
all the actual point of, and intention behind, their usages in the context of particular
language games. To refine his methodological tools, Skinner also drew on Austin's the-
ory of speech acts, which enjoyed immense popularity in the scholarly community of
the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, he borrowed that crucial notion of the illocutionary
act, which was at the heart of Austin's elaborations on "how to do things with words"
and which nicely dovetailed with Wittgenstein's dictum "words are also deeds".34
30 See Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas (1969/88), pp. 32-49, 57; for different
takes on the issue of anachronism see Mark Bevir, Are there Perennial Problems in Political Theory?, in:
Political Studies 42 (1994), pp. 662-675; Conal Condren, A Reflection on the Problem of Anachronism
in Intellectual History, in: Scientia Poetica 8 (2004), pp. 288-293.
31 The most recent comments on Skinner’s shifting viewpoints offers Robert Lamb, Quentin Skinner’s
“Post-Modern” History of Ideas, in: History 89 (2004), pp. 424-433; id., Recent Developments in the
Thought of Quentin Skinner and the Ambitions of Contextualism, in: Journal of the Philosophy of
History 3 (2009), pp. 246-265; id., Quentin Skinner’s Revised Historical Contextualism. A Critique, in:
History of the Human Sciences 22 (2009), No. 3, pp. 51-73.
32 Quentin Skinner, A Third Concept of Liberty [Isaiah Berlin Lecture], in: Proceedings of the British
Academy 117 (2002), pp. 237-268; see also id., Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge 1998; and his
earlier piece: The Idea of Negative Liberty. Philosophical and Historical Perspectives, in: Richard
Rorty/J.B. Schneewind/Quentin Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History. Essays on the Historiography
of Philosophy, Cambridge 1984, pp. 193-221.
33 Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas (1969/88), p. 30.
34 See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words [The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard
University in 1955], ed. by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1975 (first
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Skinner, to put it differently, urged his colleagues to focus their studies on autho-
rial intentions, i.e. the intended illocutionary force of texts, and he geared historians
towards the question as to what thinkers were doing in articulating ideas. Not dissimi-
lar to Koselleck's understanding of concepts,35 Skinner conceived of ideas as polemical
tools and rhetorical weapons purposefully employed in battles of legitimization. He ar-
gued that texts in political and social philosophy should primarily be read as "moves"
and interventions through which authors supported or criticized, commended or con-
demned the "actions" of other authors, particular institutions, or certain states of affairs.
Potential entrapments in the hermeneutic circle aside, Skinner's intentionalism became
the basso continuo running through his methodological articles in the decades to follow,
when he had to make himself heard over a polyphonic choir performing variations on
William Wimsatt's and Monroe Beardsley's famed theme of the "intentional fallacy" –
whether the "composer's" name be Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, or Jacques Der-
rida.
Intentionalism is, of course, only one aspect of Skinner's methodology. It is with
good reason that his monograph series is called "ideas in context" (more on this in
the following section). Skinner argued that historians needed to lay bare the relevant
linguistic conventions, such as genres and rhetorical traditions, which a writer must
follow to reach his target audience in the market of opinions. For instance, the more
broadly a positively evaluative term was taken to be applicable, the wider the range
of actions a writer could hope to legitimize. If historians succeeded in recreating the
linguistic context, Skinner claimed, they could eventually "read off" what a writer was
doing.36
Scrutiny of the linguistic context, however, has featured still more prominently in the
work of Skinner's colleague John Pocock. Whether he used the terms "paradigm", "dis-
course" or "language" (his analytical framework was never geared towards linguistic
consistency), Pocock has placed more emphasis than Skinner on the constraining power
of language. Indeed, he has been more of a structuralist historian than his supposed al-
ter ego in Cambridge. As he pointed out in a widely read article published in 1987,
he was mainly interested in studying "languages in which utterances were performed,
rather than the utterances which were performed in them", which meant that the exam-
ination of "idioms, rhetorics, specialized vocabularies and grammars" that transcended
the writings of one particular author took priority over the production of intellectual
biographies so fashionable these days.37
published 1962); for a recent critique of Skinner’s concept of “meaning” see A.P. Martinich, Four Senses
of “Meaning” in the History of Ideas. Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical Interpretation, in: Journal
of the Philosophy of History 3 (2009), pp. 225-245.
35 See the enlightening comments by Reinhard Mehring, Begriffssoziologie, Begriffsgeschichte, Begriff-
spolitik. Zur Form der Ideengeschichtsschreibung nach Carl Schmitt und Reinhart Koselleck, in:
Bluhm/Gebhardt (eds.), Politische Ideengeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert, pp. 31-50.
36 Quentin Skinner, A Reply to my Critics, in: Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context, pp. 231-288, here p. 275.
37 J.G.A. Pocock, The Concept of a Language and the Métier d’Historien. Some Considerations on Practice,
in: Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge
1987, also in: Pocock, Political Thought and History, pp. 87-105, here pp. 88-89; see also J.G.A. Pocock,
Languages and their Implications. The Transformation of the Study of Political Thought, in: id., Pol-
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Instead of engaging the vast literature of critical assessments of the Cambridge
School,38 I will be using the remainder of this section to discuss, if only very briefly,
approaches to intellectual history that have been advanced by two very different schol-
ars: Mark Bevir and Dominick LaCapra. Informed by post-analytic philosophy – and
hence no easy read for historians unfamiliar with the philosophical discipline – Bevir's
Logic of the History of Ideas, published in 1999, provides a normative second-order study
of intellectual history and the human sciences in general, exploring key concepts of the
field such as tradition, meaning and belief. As Bevir explained in one of the numer-
ous debates on his book, the Logic may also be read as an attempt to put the approach
of the Cambridge School on a surer philosophical footing.39 Taking his cue from the
philosophical strands of "holism", "postfoundationalism" and "folk psychology", and
drawing on philosophies of mind, language and action as developed by Wittgenstein,
Quine and Davidson, Bevir maintains that ideas cannot have any innate meanings but
possess meaning only in relation to agents, which alone are able to provide the "back-
ground theories" that lend meaning to ideas. Therefore, ideas only exist as beliefs,
which historians are to ascribe to people while being governed by logical presump-
tions in favour of sincere, conscious and rational beliefs – "rational" being defined as
"consistent". These beliefs are, moreover, part of wider "webs of belief" which arise
against the background of intellectual and social traditions. "Webs of belief" is one of
the Logic's pivotal terms, one which Bevir borrows from Quine and Ullian's classic in-
troduction to the study of rational belief,40 and which is, in fact, at the heart of Bevir's
understanding of intellectual history as the history of beliefs.
While some historians may shrug their shoulders, wondering at the necessity to write
a dense three-hundred-page account of this conception of intellectual history (let alone
hundreds of pages of comments and "replies to critics"), Bevir has doubtless resolved
various philosophical problems that marked Skinner's and Pocock's contextualism. It
would go beyond the scope of this article to expound Bevir's analytical framework
of "weak intentionalism" and "procedural individualism", which relates hermeneutic
meanings to the expressed beliefs of individual agents (whether authors or readers)
and escapes the typical pitfalls of historical reasoning that either emerge from assump-
tions of a priori intentions un-mediated through language or that follow from notions of
structuralism which imply mind-independent meanings. Suffice it to say that the Logic
not only offers crucial insights into the generation of meaning and the complex inner
workings of "webs of belief", but also provides strategies to explain intellectual change
through the exploration of "dilemmas" that are triggered by the (mediated) appropria-
itics, Language and Time. Essays on Political Thought and History, new ed. Chicago/London 1989
(first published 1971), pp. 3-41, here pp. 25, 29.
38 See above all the recent comments by Mark Bevir, Contextualism. From Modernist Method to Post-
Analytic Historicism?, in: Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (2009), pp. 211-224; Robert D. Hume,
Pocock’s Contextual Historicism, in: D.N. DeLuna (ed.), The Political Imagination in History. Essays
Concerning J.G.A. Pocock, Baltimore 2006, pp. 27-55; William Walker, J.G.A. Pocock and the History of
British Political Thought. Assessing the State of the Art, in: Eighteenth-Century Life 33 (2009), No. 1,
pp. 83-96.
39 See Mark Bevir, Clarifications, in: History of European Ideas 28 (2002), pp. 83-100, here pp. 86-87.
40 See W.V. Quine/J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, 2nd ed. New York 1978 (first published 1970).
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tion of new experiences or forms of reasoning.
If Skinner and Pocock may be said to have offered new methodological avenues and
a useful heuristic for intellectual historians, and if Bevir may be credited with provid-
ing the field with a sound philosophical basis, then Dominick LaCapra stands out as the
master of reflection. He is the great "problematizer", fighting the evils of reductionism.
Nothing is simple, everything is complex. LaCapra's goal is to complicate things. One
of the most distinguished exponents of the field, he has taught intellectual history at
Cornell University for more than four decades. His work is greatly indebted to psycho-
analysis, philosophy and literary theory, and is replete with appropriations of Sigmund
Freud, Martin Heidegger, Mikhail Bakhtin and Jacques Derrida. It is not always easy,
therefore, to follow the circuitous meanderings of his reflections.41 In this article I will
focus on two issues: the relation of text and context, and the practice of reading.
One of LaCapra's anti-reductionist missions is to counter simplistic strategies of con-
textualization. Aimed at practices he detects in the work of social and cultural histo-
rians, he cautions not to hypostatize the context and render it a "dominant structure
saturating the text with a certain meaning". The context itself, he argues, is "a text of
sorts".42 "Meaning", he claims, "is indeed context-bound, but context is not itself bound
in any simple or unproblematic way". Instead, he points to the inter-textual quali-
ties of contexts. Moreover, he finds fault with contextualist practices of intellectual
historians who use "simple documentary texts" or "simplistic interpretations" thereof
in order to constitute a context to which they subject, and make conform, "complex
texts".43 Obviously, LaCapra distinguishes various types of texts: On the one hand
there are texts "especially valuable to think with" – that is, complex "worklike" texts
which "actively invite continual self-questioning" and are "particularly effective in en-
gaging critical processes", potentially unleashing "transformative forces"; on the other
hand, there are texts merely "worth thinking about" – that is, documentary texts which
are symptomatic of and perpetuate existing structures of thought (LaCapra speaks of
"ideologies").44 This distinction makes LaCapra a supporter of "canon formation", even
though the contours of his "self-questioning" canon never really clarify themselves.
41 In fact, some of his deliberations are so vague that one may wonder at both their effectiveness and fal-
sifiability. See, for instance, some passages in Dominick LaCapra, Intellectual History and Its Ways, in:
American Historical Review 97 (1992), pp. 425-439; for a critique see Russell Jacoby, A New Intellectual
History?, in: American Historical Review 97 (1992), pp. 405-424.
42 Dominick LaCapra, Reading Exemplars. Wittgenstein’s Vienna and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, in: Diacrit-
ics 9 (1979), also in: id., Rethinking Intellectual History. Texts, Contexts, Language, Ithaca/London
1983, pp. 84-117, here pp. 95, 117. LaCapra’s understanding of “text”, of course, is broader than
conventional usages of the term would suggest, comprising any kind of cultural artefact or “signi-
fying practice”, and largely following Derrida’s notion of a “general text” made up of a relational
network of “instituted traces”. Dominick LaCapra, Introduction, in: id., Soundings in Critical Theory,
Ithaca/London 1989, pp. 1-10, here p. 7; id., Canons, Texts, and Contexts, in: id., Representing the
Holocaust. History, Theory, Trauma, Ithaca/London 1994, pp. 19-41, here p. 23. A former version of
the essay Canons, Texts, and Contexts appeared in the Intellectual History Newsletter 13 (1991).
43 LaCapra, Reading Exemplars, p. 117.
44 LaCapra, Canons, Texts, and Contexts, pp. 24-25; see also id., Rethinking Intellectual History and
Reading Texts, in: LaCapra/Kaplan (eds.), Modern European Intellectual History, also in: LaCapra,
Rethinking Intellectual History – Texts, Contexts, Language, pp. 23-71, here pp. 29-33.
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There are not only different kinds of texts, however, but also, and more impor-
tantly, different techniques of reading (LaCapra speaks of "protocols"): first, "the de-
nial or repression of reading", which follows from conventional and "self-sufficient
research paradigms" and relegates any text to the status of symptomatic documents;
second, the synoptic reading, which offers condensed content analyses characterized
by paraphrases and concise theme-centred reconstructions of arguments and contexts
– a method LaCapra sees exemplified, in its most sophisticated form, in the acclaimed
works of Steven E. Aschheim and Martin Jay; third, the deconstructive reading, which
eschews synoptic, content-oriented reductionisms, decentres authorial agency, and un-
covers "internal contestations" in texts; fourth, the redemptive reading, which tran-
scends tensions in a harmonizing, neo-Hegelian fashion, and endows even traumatic
experiences with meaning; and fifth, the dialogic reading, which combines the recon-
struction of texts as "networks of resistances" and a self-critical "dialogic exchange" with
them – the method LaCapra has developed, reworked, and tirelessly propagated over
the last thirty years.45 "What is the other saying or doing? How do I – or we – respond to
it?" This is the question that LaCapra asks his colleagues to consider when approaching
texts.46 Intellectual history should not only historicize past texts; it should also actively
engage and "carry" them into the present as a critical form of "political intervention".47
Journals, Networks and Monograph Series: The Revival of Intellectual
History
In articles on intellectual history it has become something of a commonplace to either
bemoan its marginal status or hail its surprising renaissance. In the United States the
1950s are typically viewed as the golden age of this academic field, while the 1970s
are usually regarded as its nadir.48 The rise of social history caused headaches among
intellectual historians who often felt attacked and marginalised from the mid-1960s
onward.49 The momentum seemed to shift again in wake of the linguistic and cultural
turn that reached the mainstream of American historical writing in the late 1980s.50
45 Dominick LaCapra, History, Reading, and Critical Theory, in: id., History and Reading. Toc-
queville, Foucault, French Studies [Green College Lectures, University of British Columbia],
Toronto/Buffalo/London 2000, pp. 21-72. This text draws on an earlier publication: Dominick La-
Capra, History, Language, and Reading. Waiting for Crillon, in: American Historical Review 100
(1995), pp. 799-828. The quotation “networks of resistances” is taken from LaCapra, Rethinking In-
tellectual History and Reading Texts, p. 64.
46 LaCapra, History, Reading, and Critical Theory, p. 67.
47 LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts, p. 63; see also id., Canons, Texts, and
Contexts, pp. 32-41.
48 See John Higham, The Rise of American Intellectual History, in: American Historical Review 56 (1951),
pp. 453-471; see also the more recent overviews of American intellectual history by Thomas Bender,
Intellectual and Cultural History, in: Eric Foner (ed.), The New American History, rev. and exp. ed.
Philadelphia 1997, pp. 181-202; David A. Hollinger, American Intellectual History, 1907-2007, in: James
M. Banner, Jr. (ed.), A Century of American Historiography, Boston/New York 2010, pp. 21-29.
49 See J.G.A. Pocock, A New Bark up an Old Tree, in: Intellectual History Newsletter 8 (April 1986), pp.
3-9, here p. 3.
50 See the important article by John E. Toews, Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn. The Au-
tonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience, in: American Historical Review 92 (1987),
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Since then, intellectual history has indeed been gathering force.
A glance at the relevant journals, academic networks and monograph series may be
indicative of this revival. To begin with, the annual publication of the Intellectual History
Newsletter, launched in 1979, at times resembled a collection of notes from the academic
underground, and the advance of self-publishing technology did little to dispel the im-
pression of a student newspaper. The Newsletter was the platform of the Intellectual
History Group founded two years earlier at a conference dedicated to the "tasks and
opportunities of American intellectual history". As the editors of the conference vol-
ume freely admitted, the gathering was a crisis meeting scheduled in the midst of a
siege.51 The rhetoric used by the editors of the successor journal Modern Intellectual
History could hardly be more different. In their first editorial from 2004, the editors
praised the reemergence of intellectual history as an expanded interdisciplinary enter-
prise. Published with Cambridge University Press, the trimester journal claims to be
the first of its kind, implicitly denying the legacy of its samizdat-like predecessor.52
In 2007 the Intellectual History Review appeared for the first time, inviting articles on
"intellectual work in social, cultural and historical context".53 While Modern Intellec-
tual History is primarily devoted to the period from the mid-seventeenth century to the
present, the Intellectual History Review rarely publishes anything that post-dates the En-
lightenment. Preceded by the newsletter Intellectual News, the Review also serves as the
publishing outlet of the International Society for Intellectual History (ISIH) which was
founded in London in 1994.54 The Society aims to foster and coordinate initiatives of
key institutions in the academic field, drawing support from the Journal of the History of
Ideas (the 70-year-old American flagship of the discipline) as well as having ties to the
Herzog August Library in Wolfenbüttel, Germany. This research centre is not only en-
gaged in organizing conferences on intellectual history and preparing an International
Dictionary of Intellectual Historians that was initiated by the ISIH.55 In cooperation
with the German Literature Archive in Marbach and the Foundation of Weimar Clas-
sics, it also launched the journal Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte in 2007. In its objective of
transcending disciplinary boundaries, the Zeitschrift largely follows the example of its
pp. 879-907; see also David Harlan, Intellectual History and the Return of Literature, in: American
Historical Review 94 (1989), pp. 581-609.
51 John Higham/Paul K. Conkin (eds.), New Directions in American Intellectual History, Balti-
more/London 1979; see also [Thomas Bender], Organization of the Intellectual History Group, in:
Newsletter – Intellectual History Group 1 (Spring 1979), p. 1. The book is dedicated, “with esteem
and affection”, to Merle Curti, one of the most popular intellectual historians between the mid-1930s
and the mid-1960s. See, for instance, Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought, 3rd ed. New
York/Evanston/London 1964 (first published 1943).
52 See [Charles Capper/Anthony J. LaVopa/Nicholas Phillipson], Editorial, in: Modern Intellectual His-
tory 1 (2004), pp. 1-2.
53 Stephen Clucas/Stephen Gaukroger, Editor’s Introduction, in: Intellectual History Review 1 (2007), p.
1.
54 See Constance Blackwell, Editor’s Letter. The Inaugural Issue, in: Intellectual News. Newsletter of the
International Society for Intellectual History 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 5-7.
55 See the contributions to the conference on Intellectual History in a Global Age in: Journal of the History of
Ideas 66 (2005), No. 2, especially Ulrich Johannes Schneider, The International Dictionary of Intellectual
Historians, pp. 143-154, and Allan Megill, Globalization and the History of Ideas, pp. 179-187.
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nominal equivalent in the U.S., the Journal of the History of Ideas. Yet, as it runs a regular
section called "think-image" (Denkbild), it seems more committed than its older sibling
to embracing visual history as an integral part of its profile.56
The Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte no doubt testifies to the rise of a multifaceted in-
tellectual history in German academia. Its profile is both thematically and method-
ologically broader than the two journals that previously defined the field in terms of
academic periodicals: the Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistes-
geschichte, founded in 1923, which has usually been preoccupied with literary criticism,
whereas the Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, founded in 1948 and associ-
ated with the Society for Intellectual History (Gesellschaft für Geistesgeschichte), has been
mainly concerned with the history of religion, Jewish intellectual history, and studies
informed by Hans-Joachim Schoeps' Zeitgeist approach (which tried to capture the "the
spirit of the age"), even though the journal's purview has certainly expanded in recent
years.57
That intellectual history has gained a more prominent position in the field of Ger-
man academia may also be gleaned from the attention drawn to it by Germany's pre-
mier journals of historical scholarship. Both the Historische Zeitschrift and Geschichte
und Gesellschaft – the latter of which has traditionally been rather sceptical towards the
ethereal sub-discipline – have been discussing new approaches to intellectual history
in the last ten years.58 Additionally, prompted by the recent publication of important
studies on the subject,59 the British periodical German History recently devoted a dis-
cussion forum to new perspectives on the intellectual history of West Germany.60 More
remarkable still is the new monograph series Ordnungssysteme, which is geared towards
a methodological renewal of Ideengeschichte and focusses on the interplay between in-
56 See Ulrich Raulff/Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer/Hellmut Th. Seemann, Einen Anfang machen. Warum
wir eine Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte gründen, in: Zeitschrift für Ideengeschichte 1 (2007), No. 1,
pp. 4-6; see also Warren Breckman, Konzeption und Geschichte des Journal of the History of Ideas, in:
ibid., pp. 106-113.
57 For a recent overview of the history of the Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte and the now
Potsdam-based Society for Intellectual History see Joachim H. Knoll, Jahresringe der Religions- und
Geistesgeschichte, in: Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 60 (2008), No. 1, pp. 1-19; for
Hans-Joachim Schoeps’ Zeitgeist approach see Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Was ist und was will die Geis-
tesgeschichte. Über Theorie und Praxis der Zeitgeistforschung, Göttingen 1959.
58 See, for instance, Alexander Gallus, “Intellectual History” mit Intellektuellen und ohne sie. Facetten
neuerer geistesgeschichtlicher Forschung, in: Historische Zeitschrift 288 (2009), pp. 139-150; Friedrich
Kießling, Westernisierung, Internationalisierung, Bürgerlichkeit? Zu einigen jüngeren Arbeiten der
Ideengeschichte der alten Bundesrepublik, in: Historische Zeitschrift 287 (2008), pp. 363-389. Volumes
27 (2001) and 33 (2007) of Geschichte und Gesellschaft, respectively, were devoted to Neue Ideengeschichte
and Intellektuelle.
59 See above all Jens Hacke, Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit. Die liberalkonservative Begründung der
Bundesrepublik, Göttingen 2006; A. Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past, Cambridge
2007; see also Dominik Geppert/Jens Hacke (eds.), Streit um den Staat. Intellektuelle Debatten in der
Bundesrepublik 1960-1980, Göttingen 2008; and most recently Sonja Asal/Stephan Schlak (eds.), Was
war Bielefeld? Eine ideengeschichtliche Nachfrage, Göttingen 2009; Jens Hacke, Die Bundesrepublik
als Idee. Zur Legitimationsbedürftigkeit politischer Ordnung, Hamburg 2009.
60 Elliot Neaman/A. Dirk Moses/Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey/Jens Hacke/Christina von Hodenberg/Thomas
Meyer, The Intellectual History of the Federal Republic, in: German History 27 (2009), pp. 244-258.
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tellectual, political and social phenomena. It is not committed to any unitary approach,
but leaves it largely to its authors to pursue new avenues. While some of them have fol-
lowed the increasingly popular trend of intellectual biographies,61 others have success-
fully combined intellectual history with Pierre Bourdieu's methodological toolkit,62 or
have deployed Ludwik Fleck's conceptual framework, which revolves around "styles"
and "collectives of thought" (Denkstile and Denkkollektive).63
The Ordnungssysteme series has provided a publishing outlet for the Tübingen-based
"Westernization" project64 as well as for a major research programme on "approaches
to a new intellectual history". The programme comprised thirty-one projects and was
funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) between 1997 and 2003. Taking
its cue from Max Weber's oft-quoted notion of ideas and world views as a "moving
force" (Weichensteller) behind interests and social action,65 the programme placed much
emphasis on the question of the social impact and diffusion of ideas – ideas being
loosely defined as "imagined formations" (gedachte Ordnungen) of a social and polit-
ical order.66 The authors' effort to anchor ideas in concrete socio-cultural milieus is
comparable to the "social history of American thought" advanced by Merle Curti from
the 1940s onward67 and to the "social history of ideas" discussed in America by Peter
61 See, for instance, Marcus M. Payk, Der Geist der Demokratie. Intellektuelle Orientierungsversuche im
Feuilleton der frühen Bundesrepublik: Karl Korn und Peter de Mendelssohn, München 2008.
62 See above all the model study by Morten Reitmayer, Elite. Sozialgeschichte einer politisch-
gesellschaftlichen Idee in der frühen Bundesrepublik, München 2009; for a helpful introduction to
Bourdieu that may be of interest to intellectual historians see Olaf Blaschke/Lutz Raphael, Im Kampf
um Positionen. Änderungen im Feld der französischen und deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach
1945, in: Jan Eckel/Thomas Etzemüller (eds.), Neue Zugänge zur Geschichte der Geschichtswis-
senschaft, Göttingen 2007, pp. 69-109; and Richard Shusterman (ed.), Bourdieu. A Critical Reader,
Oxford 1999.
63 See Thomas Etzemüller, Sozialgeschichte als politische Geschichte. Werner Conze und die Neuori-
entierung der westdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945, München 2001; Frieder Günther,
Denken vom Staat her. Die bundesdeutsche Staatsrechtslehre zwischen Dezision und Integration 1949-
1970, München 2004.
64 See Michael Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und
die Deutschen, München 1998, which also contains a programmatic foreword by the series’ editors:
Dietrich Beyrau/Anselm Doering-Manteuffel/Lutz Raphael, Vorwort der Herausgeber, pp. 9-13; see
furthermore Julia Angster, Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie. Die Westernisierung von SPD
und DGB, München 2003.
65 See the classic commentary by M. Rainer Lepsius, Interessen und Ideen. Die Zurechnungsproblematik
bei Max Weber (1986), in: id., Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen, Opladen 1990, pp. 31-43; see also
the early deliberations by the Weber expert Talcott Parsons, The Role of Ideas in Social Action, in:
American Sociological Review 3 (1938), pp. 652-664.
66 Ausschreibungstext des Schwerpunktprogramms: Ideen als gesellschaftliche Gestaltungskraft im Eu-
ropa der Neuzeit – Ansätze zu einer neuen “Geistesgeschichte” (1997), in: Lutz Raphael/Heinz-Elmar
Tenorth (eds.), Ideen als gesellschaftliche Gestaltungskraft im Europa der Neuzeit, München 2006, pp.
525-531, here p. 526; see also Lutz Raphael, “Ideen als gesellschaftliche Gestaltungskraft im Europa
der Neuzeit”. Bemerkungen zur Bilanz eines DFG-Schwerpunktprogramms, in: ibid., pp. 11-27.
67 Curti, American Thought, p. vi; see also his earlier book: The Social Ideas of American Educators,
New York 1935; see further the stimulating article by Franklin L. Baumer, Intellectual History and its
Problems, in: Journal of Modern History 21 (1949), pp. 191-203; and the comments by Higham, Rise of
American Intellectual History, pp. 470-471; Rush Welter, The History of Ideas in America. An Essay in
Redefinition, in: Journal of American History 51 (1965), pp. 599-614, here p. 602.
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Gay and Robert Darnton from the late 1960s on.68 Bourdieu has featured less promi-
nently in American intellectual history,69 though, despite attempts at transdisciplinary
and transnational mediation by historians like Roger Chartier, whose own reflections
on the circulation of texts, the practice of reading, and the production of representations
have been widely discussed in the U.S.70 While, in terms of methodology, the interna-
tional impact of both the monograph series and the collaborative research programme
may appear rather limited, they are a clear milestone in the development of the sub-
discipline in Germany, where its reputation had long been tainted by (at times fairly
stereotypical) notions of Friedrich Meinecke's Ideengeschichte or Wilhelm Dilthey's and
Ernst Cassirer's Geistesgeschichte.71
Tackling ideas in their historical contexts rather than treating them as free-floating
and disembodied entities marked by a timeless quality – this also lies at the heart of the
monograph series Ideas in Context, launched by Cambridge University Press in 1984.
The Ideas in Context series is sometimes seen as exerting a defining influence on the
entire field of British intellectual history – and beyond.72 The series' first volume was
largely an Anglo-American co-production and derived from a series of lectures given
at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, a hub of intellectual history in the United
States.73 Johns Hopkins is not only home to major exponents of the so-called Cam-
bridge School (geographically somewhat counterintuitive), but also the cradle of its
intellectually rather distant relatives: the Journal of the History of Ideas and the still older
History of Ideas Club.74 The series has hitherto launched more than ninety mono-
68 See Peter Gay, The Social History of Ideas. Ernst Cassirer and After, in: Kurt H. Wolff/Barrington
Moore, Jr. (eds.), The Critical Spirit. Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, Boston 1967, pp. 106-120;
and, fairly critical of Gay’s attempt to translate his approach into practice, Robert Darnton, In Search of
the Enlightenment. Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas, in: Journal of Modern History
43 (1971), pp. 113-132; see more recently Robert Darnton, Two Paths through the Social History of
Ideas, in: Haydn T. Mason (ed.), The Darnton Debate. Books and Revolution in the Eighteenth Century,
Oxford 1998, pp. 251-294.
69 For a notable exception see Fritz Ringer, Fields of Knowledge. French Academic Culture in Compara-
tive Perspective, 1890-1920, Cambridge 1992, esp. pp. 1-25; see also, however, the sceptical comments
on Ringer’s analytical framework by Martin Jay, Fieldwork and Theorizing in Intellectual History, in:
Theory and Society 19 (1990), pp. 311-321; and the rejoinder by Fritz Ringer in: Theory and Society 19
(1990), pp. 323-334.
70 For an attempt to familiarize an American audience with French approaches to intellectual history,
from the days of Lucien Febvre onward, see Roger Chartier, Intellectual History or Sociocultural His-
tory? The French Trajectories, in: LaCapra/Kaplan (eds.), Modern European Intellectual History, pp.
13-46.
71 For a recent view on Dilthey’s and Cassirer’s intellectual history see Stephan Otto, Ungelöste Prob-
leme in Diltheys und Cassirers Renaissancedeutung. Überlegungen zu den Prämissen und Methoden
einer ideengeschichtlichen Rekonstruktion der frühen Neuzeit, in: Thomas Leinkauf (ed.), Dilthey
und Cassirer. Die Deutung der Neuzeit als Muster von Geistes- und Kulturgeschichte, Hamburg 2003,
pp. 21-37; see also Andreas Hoeschen, “Geistesgeschichte” versus “History of Ideas”? Ernst Cassir-
ers Beitrag zur ideengeschichtlichen Begriffsbildung im Kontext der Lovejoy-Spitzer-Kontroverse, in:
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 75 (2001), pp. 145-174.
72 See, for instance, the appraisals in: Richard Whatmore/Brian Young (eds.), Palgrave Advances in In-
tellectual History, Basingstoke/New York 2006.
73 Rorty/Schneewind/Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History.
74 For the History of Ideas Club see George Boas et al., Studies in Intellectual History, Baltimore 1953; see
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graphs, amounting to a total sales figure of over 170,000 copies. This figure has, more-
over, been far exceeded by the sales success of the student-oriented series Cambridge
Texts in the History of Political Thought, which has complemented the renowned mono-
graph series since 1988, introducing classic and not-so-classic texts in political philoso-
phy to the English-speaking mass market of higher education.75
Spaces and Emotions: Some Future Perspectives on Intellectual History
While in the British system of higher education it has become increasingly common,
though still not very popular, to work out in minute detail what one's own university
will hopefully look like twenty years from now, I will resist the temptation to formulate
any full-fledged schemes for the future of a sub-discipline. Instead, I will use this brief
conclusion to sketch out two areas of investigation that may hold some promise for
intellectual historians: spatial history and the history of emotions.
Intellectual history, I submit, would benefit from a more sustained attempt to engage
recent debates on spatial history. Many significant studies have been published on the
history of geographical imaginations – investigations, for example, of "the West", "the
East", "Europe" and "Central Europe" – some of them with an eye to the spatialization
of political thought and the deployment of spatial images in political discourse. Intel-
lectual historians, however, have rarely sought advice on methodological issues from
colleagues in the Geography Department or from sociologists with a focus on spatial
theory, such as Henri Lefebvre.76 The booming field of cultural and human geogra-
phy has a lot to offer to intellectual historians who may find valuable inspiration in the
studies of John A. Agnew, Denis Cosgrove, Stephen Daniels, James S. Duncan, Derek
Gregory, David Harvey, Doreen Massey and Yi-Fu Tuan.77 A transfer of knowledge
from geographers to intellectual historians could, among other things, help broaden
the source-base of the field, providing the necessary tools to read and deconstruct his-
torical maps. Despite the criticism his approach has attracted in recent years, Brian
Harley's reflections on the deconstruction of maps still offer a suitable starting point.78
also George Boas, The History of Ideas. An Introduction, New York 1969.
75 See the useful article by CUP executive director Richard Fisher, “How To Do Things With Books”.
Quentin Skinner and the Dissemination of Ideas, in: History of European Ideas 35 (2009), pp. 276-280,
here pp. 278-280. Given that about 960,000 copies of the Cambridge Texts series had been sold by 2008,
it is likely that the one million threshold has been passed by now.
76 See above all Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, new ed. Malden, Oxford/Carlton 2004 (first
published in English 1991, in French 1974).
77 See most recently the useful introductions to spatial theorists in: Phil Hubbard/Rob Kitchin/Gill
Valentine (eds.), Key Thinkers on Space and Place, Los Angeles 2004; and the reader by Phil Hub-
bard/Rob Kitchin/Gill Valentine (eds.), Key Texts in Human Geography, Los Angeles 2008; see also
the literature referred to in my article: Riccardo Bavaj, Was bringt der “Spatial Turn” der Region-
algeschichte? Ein Beitrag zur Methodendiskussion, in: Westfälische Forschungen 56 (2006), pp. 457-
484.
78 See the posthumously published collection of articles: John B. Harley, The New Nature of Maps. Es-
says in the History of Cartography, ed. by Paul Laxton, Baltimore 2001, especially the critical intro-
duction by J.H. Andrews as well as Harley’s article Deconstructing the Map (1989), in: ibid., pp. 1-32,
150-168; for recent attempts in German scholarship to make use of maps see Patrick Lehn, Deutsch-
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Furthermore, I believe that intellectual history might profit from recent discussions
on the history of emotions. In this respect A. Dirk Moses' study on German Intellectuals
and the Nazi Past is of particular interest. Moses postulates a binary opposition within
the "emotional and intellectual economy" of what he calls the "45ers" – that "key gen-
eration of postwar German intellectual history" which has received much attention in
recent scholarship. Moses identifies two political languages in the discourse of "45ers":
"integrative republicanism" and "redemptive republicanism". Without going into de-
tail here, let it suffice to say that he relates this political dualism to distinct patterns of
emotional reactions to the Nazi past, such as particular kinds of "stigma management",
ways of coping with the "moral contamination" of Germany, and a variety of "displace-
ment strategies".79 While there are problems with Moses' central argument,80 he has
shown a suggestive way of taking on the enormous challenge of explaining political
beliefs.81
Despite the efforts of Bevir and LaCapra, intellectual historians have been wary of
resorting to psychological patterns of explanation; and some of the tendencies of psy-
chohistory that evolved in the 1970s certainly give pause for thought.82 However, there
is something unsatisfying about a kind of intellectual history that keeps a close eye on
discourses while defying any sustained consideration of the psychological workings of
the mind, which are, after all, part of the complex relationship between thought and
language. No wonder that Lucien Febvre's notion of the "mental equipment" (outillage
mental) was not confined to linguistic structures but also comprised structures of af-
fectivity – emotions, in other words.83 To get a grip on emotions, intellectual histo-
rians may find William M. Reddy's concept of "emotives" useful, which he modelled
on Austin's speech-act theory and set in the context of Quine and Davidson's interpre-
landbilder. Historische Schulatlanten zwischen 1871 und 1990. Ein Handbuch, Köln/Weimar/Wien
2008; Christof Dipper/Ute Schneider (eds.), Kartenwelten. Der Raum und seine Repräsentation in der
Neuzeit, Darmstadt 2006.
79 Moses, German Intellectuals, pp. 5, 12, 28-29, 31-37, 51.
80 See my comments in Riccardo Bavaj, Turning “Liberal Critics” into “Liberal-Conservatives”. Kurt
Sontheimer and the Re-Coding of the Political Culture in the Wake of the Student Revolt of “1968”,
in: German Politics & Society 27 (2009), pp. 39-59, here pp. 42-44; for an attempt to historicize the
notion of the “45ers” see my article: Riccardo Bavaj, Young, Old, and In-Between. Liberal Scholars
and “Generation Building” at the Time of West Germany’s Student Revolt, forthcoming in: Anna von
der Goltz (ed.), Talkin’ ‘bout My Generation. Conflicts of Generation Building and Europe’s 1968,
Göttingen 2011.
81 For another recent attempt to combine intellectual history with the history of emotions see Marcus
M. Payk, Das “Pathos der Nüchternheit”? Über Emotionalität, Generation und Demokratie in West-
deutschland 1945-1970, in: Moderne. Kulturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch 3 (2007), pp. 128-141.
82 See Gerald Izenberg, Psychohistory and Intellectual History, in: History & Theory 14 (1975), pp. 139-
155.
83 See Lucien Febvre, Le problème de l’incroyance au XVIe siècle. La religion de Rabelais, Paris 1942; see
also the helpful comments by Chartier, Intellectual History or Sociocultural History?, pp. 18-22. For
an early attempt to combine the study of ideas with methods of social psychology see James Harvey
Robinson, Conception and Methods of History, in: Howard J. Rogers (ed.), Congress of Arts and Sci-
ence. Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904, Vol. 2, Boston/New York 1906, pp. 50-51; id., The Mind in
the Making. The Relation of Intelligence to Social Reform, New York/London 1921.
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tive framework of translation.84 If one's dissatisfaction with the linguistic turn is even
greater, one might wish to explore the physical dimension of emotions – that is, their
"habitualization" and "materialization" in "bodily techniques" and practices.85 What-
ever approach one chooses, it seems vital to conceive communicative spaces of the past
not merely as constituted by the limits of what could be thought, said and done86 but as
defined by the limits of what could be felt – at a particular time, in a particular place.87
If nothing else, the plethora of approaches to intellectual history testify to the very
elusiveness of the field. It is probably easier to say what today's intellectual history
is not, or at least ought not to be, than to make any definitive statement about its
precincts. Gone are the days when intellectual historians tackled monstrous beasts
such as "the German mind" or "the American character"; and they no longer chase the
Hegelian World Spirit (Weltgeist) or pursue purportedly unchanging, metaphysically
pure ideas in their journey through time. The hikes from one towering mountaintop to
the other – to evoke Friedrich Meinecke's oft-quoted metaphor88 – have largely fallen
out of fashion. Overall, the source-base has become broader, the methodology used has
become more sophisticated, and the questions asked have become more specific. It also
seems as if intellectual historians have become more amenable to methods and issues
of transnational history – as have so many other groupings in the historical commu-
nity.89 These observations of scholarly progress may sound Whiggish, but it is hard to
deny that today's intellectual history looks much different from some of its ancestors.90
It goes without saying, of course, that there still exist largely unexplored shores: Many
intellectual historians still shy away from drawing on images, sounds or built environ-
84 See William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling. A Framework for the History of Emotions, Cam-
bridge 2001; see also the critical assessment of Reddy’s study by James Smith Allen, Navigating the
Social Sciences. A Theory for the Meta-History of Emotions, in: History & Theory 42 (2003), pp. 82-93.
85 See the instructive article by Pascal Eitler/Monique Scheer, Emotionengeschichte als Körpergeschichte.
Eine heuristische Perspektive auf religiöse Konversionen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, in: Geschichte
und Gesellschaft 35 (2009), pp. 282-313.
86 See the important study by Willibald Steinmetz, Das Sagbare und das Machbare. Zum Wandel politis-
cher Handlungsspielräume. England 1780-1867, Stuttgart 1993.
87 See Ute Frevert, Was haben Gefühle in der Geschichte zu suchen?, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 35
(2009), pp. 183-208, here p. 205; see also the interesting discussion forum on the history of emotions in:
German History 28 (2010), pp. 67-80.
88 See Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (1936), ed. by Carl Hinrichs, München 1959,
p. 6.
89 See most recently Robert Adcock/Mark Bevir/Shannon C. Stimson (eds.), Modern Political Science.
Anglo-American Exchanges since 1880, Princeton/Oxford 2007; Christophe Charle/Julien Vincent/Jay
Winter (eds.), Anglo-French Attitudes. Comparisons and Transfers between English and French Intel-
lectuals since the Eighteenth Century, Manchester 2007; Christophe Charle/Jürgen Schriewer/Peter
Wagner (eds.), Transnational Intellectual Networks. Forms of Academic Knowledge and the Search for
Cultural Identities, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2004.
90 This may also be inferred from a comparison between the Dictionary of the History of Ideas which was
published in 1973/74, and its successor, the New Dictionary, which came out in 2005: Dictionary of the
History of Ideas, ed. by Philip P. Wiener, 5 Vols., New York 1973-74; The New Dictionary of the History
of Ideas, ed. by Maryanne Cline Horowitz, 6 Vols., New York 2005; see also the comments by Jotham
Parsons, Defining the History of Ideas, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 68 (2007), pp. 683-699; and
F.E.L. Priestley, Mapping the World of Ideas, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974), pp. 527-537.
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ments to create a fuller picture of intellectual landscapes.91 If more do so in future, the
boundaries of the academic field will become even fuzzier than they already are. Go
for it!
Quote as:
Riccardo Bavaj, Intellectual History, Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 13.
9.2010, URL: http://docupedia.de/zg/Intellectual_History
Copyright
Copyright (c) 2010 Clio-online e.V. und Autor, alle Rechte vorbehalten. Dieses Werk ent-
stand im Rahmen des Clio-online Projekts „Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte“ und darf ver-
vielfältigt und veröffentlicht werden, sofern die Einwilligung der Rechteinhaber vor-
liegt. Bitte kontaktieren Sie: <clio.redaktion@geschichte.hu-berlin.de>
91 See, however, John E. Toews, Integrating Music into Intellectual History. Nineteenth-Century Art Mu-
sic as a Discourse of Agency and Identity, in: Modern Intellectual History 5 (2008), pp. 309-331; see
also Maiken Umbach, Memory and Historicism. Reading between the Lines of the Built Environment,
Germany c. 1900, in: Representations 88 (2004), pp. 26-54; and the project currently researched by
Daniel Morat (Berlin), Die Klanglandschaft der Großstadt. Kulturen des Auditiven in Berlin und New
York, 1880-1930.
19
